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Executive Summary
From 1864 to 1972, the real price of oil fell by, on average, over 1% per year. This 
trend dramatically broke when prices for crude increased by over 650% from 
1972 to 1980. Policymakers adopted several policies designed to keep oil prices 
in check and reduce consumption. Missing from these policies were taxes on 
either oil or gasoline, prompting a long economics literature documenting the 
inefficiencies of these alternative policies. In this chapter, I review the policy 
discussion related to the transportation sector that occurred during the time 
through the lens of the printed press. In doing so, I pay particular attention to 
whether gasoline taxes were “on the table,” as well as how consumers viewed 
the inefficient set of policies that were ultimately adopted. The discussions at 
the time suggest that meaningful changes in gasoline taxes were on the table; the 
public discussion seemed to be much greater than it is today. Some in Congress 
and many presidential advisors in the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations 
supported and proposed gasoline taxes. The main roadblocks for taxes were 
Congress and the American people. Polling evidence at the time suggests that 
consumers preferred price controls and rationing and vehicle taxes over higher 
gasoline taxes or letting gasoline prices clear the market. Given the saliency 
of rationing and vehicle taxes, it seems difficult to argue that these alternative 
policies were adopted because they hide their true costs.
Rejecting a stiff (probably 30 or 40 cent) increase in the gasoline tax may have been the 
president’s most fateful energy decision. It relieved pressure on the automobile industry 
to break radically with its past: to produce a basic, simple, fuel- efficient car. Shorn of 
many of today’s common accessories, such a car would give good fuel mileage, but less 
power and comfort than current automobiles. It would be intended primarily for trans-
portation, not ego gratification, sex appeal, or even driving pleasure. 
Washington Post, January 31, 1975
Can you imagine how much better off we’d be if President Ford had taken bold action 
(of passing a gasoline tax)? 
Carter official, January 1980
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I. Introduction
By the end of 1972, things were great for oil. Prices were on a steady 
downward trend, falling on average by over 1% per year from 1861 to 
1972; coal was giving way to oil as a fuel for electricity generation; and, 
vehicle ownership was expanding. Figure 1 shows oil prices from 1861 
to 1972. Real prices peaked in 1864 at $115.45 per barrel and trended 
downward reaching a low point of $10.42 per barrel in 1970. 
The drop in real oil prices coincides with increases in US oil con-
sumption. Figure 2 plots consumption from 1875 to 2011. Consump-
tion increased dramatically from 0.011 quadrillion BTUs (quads) in 1875 
to nearly 35 quads in 1973. The introduction of the Ford Model T at 
the end of 1908 sparked a new use for petroleum. Vehicle ownership 
rose sharply until the Great Depression, but then appears to have con-
tinued on the pre- Great Depression trend after World War II (figure 
3). Concerns about local pollution in the 1960s prompted shifts away 
from coal- fired electricity plants to oil- fired plants. The share of elec-
tricity generation coming from oil increased from roughly 6% in 1960 
to over 16% by 1973 (figure 4). By the early 1970s, it was clear that the 
United States was consuming more and more oil, but at the same time, 
oil expenditures as a fraction of gross domestic product (GDP) were 
extremely low—hovering at levels below 2% (figure 6). 
The picture was very different by the end of 1973. In October of 1973 
the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) announced a US oil embargo. The embargo, partly in re-
taliation for the US support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War, lasted 
through March of 1974. World oil prices rose sharply to an average of 
$52.85 (in 2011 dollars) during 1974 and the United States spent over 
$300 billion on oil, nearly 7% of GDP. Expenditures on oil imports ex-
ceeded 2% of GDP. 
Prices stabilized at these higher levels until 1979 when a second oil 
shock occurred in the wake of the Iranian Revolution. Protests in Iran 
hampered oil production and led to the suspension of Iranian oil ex-
ports. With Iranian production accounting for roughly 10% of world 
oil production, these disruptions had a large effect on prices. This was 
followed by the Iran- Iraq War which lowered production in both coun-
tries. Figure 5 shows production for the top five oil producers in the 
region. Production in Iran fell from roughly six million barrels per day 
(mmbd) prior to 1978 to below 1.5 mmbd during 1980 and 1981 (world 
production hovered around 60 mmbd during this time). Iraqi produc-
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Fig. 1. Oil prices from the 1800s to 2011
Fig. 2. Oil prices and consumption
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Fig. 3. Vehicles per capita
Fig. 4. Share of electricity generation coming from oil
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tion fell below one mmbd in 1981 and 1982 from a peak of nearly 3.5 
mmbd in 1979. 
Oil prices peaked at over $100 per barrel in real terms (2011 dollars) 
in 1980; US oil outlays exceeded 10% of GDP in both 1979 and 1980 
(figure 6). Perhaps more importantly, spending on oil imports exceeded 
4.5% of US GDP in 1980. 
While prices began to fall after 1980, the events from 1973 to 1980 
made it clear that oil prices could be volatile and events in a single 
country, or a small group of organized countries, could have huge con-
sequences on prices and macroeconomic activity. 
Many pointed to the increases in oil imports as the major issue. Fig-
ure 7 plots consumption and the share of consumption coming from im-
ports from 1960 onward. The import share began to rise rapidly in the 
late 1960s; US imports increased from 18.5% in 1960 to over 36% in 1973. 
Oil imports drew the attention of policymakers even before the em-
bargo. The Eisenhower administration established the Mandatory Oil 
Import Quota Program (MOIP) in 1959. MOIP put limits on crude oil 
and refined product imports, and gave preferential treatment to oil 
imports from Canada and Mexico.1 In April of 1972, Secretary of State 
John N. Irwin testified in front of the House Interior Committee, stating: 
Fig. 5. Oil production for the top five oil producing states in the Middle East
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Fig. 6. National petroleum outlays as share of GDP
Fig. 7. Consumption and import share
This content downloaded from 018.051.000.096 on February 19, 2019 08:58:44 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
The Political Economy of Gasoline Taxes: 103
“Isn’t it self- evident that if the United States is dependent on the two- 
third to  three- fourths of the world oil supply (in Middle East countries) 
we would be hard- pressed to resist their ultimatum that we keep hands 
off Israel? It would be a problem.”2 Speaking in front of the House For-
eign Affairs Subcommittee in October of 1972, James Atkins, a State 
Department oil expert, said: “We believe that the first priority of the 
United States is to limit its increasing reliance on imported supplies of 
oil. . . . We believe that the foreign policy pitfalls of an excessive reliance 
on important energy are too serious to risk.’’3 Indeed, the 1973 embargo 
was not the first embargo. In June of 1967 several Middle East countries 
limited shipments to the United States and the United Kingdom, but 
only Syria stopped all oil exports. Given the low cost of shipping oil, 
these actions had little influence on oil prices. 
It isn’t completely clear on economic efficiency grounds that policy-
makers needed to react to the oil crises; the public debate typically was 
not couched in terms of market failures such as externalities. But, given 
the reliance of the US economy on oil consumption, one could argue 
that consumers did not internalize the costs of oil consumption asso-
ciated with its affect on macroeconomic activity and energy security.4 
There was little question that policymakers felt a need to react. 
The first response from these events was to strengthen price controls 
on oil, prompting the need for rationing rules, but long gasoline lines 
and shortages still occurred. The speed limit on highways was reduced 
to 55 miles per hour. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Stan-
dards and gas guzzler taxes were subsequently adopted. Absent from 
these policies was a gasoline tax. Indeed, price controls on both oil and 
gasoline pushed prices below equilibrium levels. The reliance on al-
ternatives to Pigouvian taxes led to a long literature in economics esti-
mating the inefficiencies of these alternative policies. (See, for example, 
Fischer, Harrington, and Parry 1982; Jacobsen forthcoming; Holland, 
Hughes, and Knittel 2009; Holland et al. 2010; and Sallee 2011.) 
In this chapter, I review the policies adopted as a response to the shocks. 
Next, I compare fuel consumption in the United States with a large set of 
countries both before and after the shocks. Finally, I review the policy dis-
cussion related to the transportation sector that occurred during the time 
through the lens of the printed press and polling. In doing so, I pay par-
ticular attention to whether gasoline taxes were “on the table,” as well as 
how consumers reacted to the inefficient set of policies ultimately adopted. 
Discussions at the time suggest that meaningful changes in gasoline 
taxes as a way to reduce consumption were on the table; the public 
This content downloaded from 018.051.000.096 on February 19, 2019 08:58:44 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
104 Knittel
discussion seemed to be much greater than it is today. This is despite the 
fact that price controls were clearly working against such taxes. Some in 
Congress and many presidential advisors in the Nixon, Ford, and Carter 
administrations supported and proposed gasoline taxes. Presidents 
Nixon and Carter supported higher gasoline taxes, while President Ford 
did not. However, Ford was a staunch advocate of decontrolling oil 
prices, and therefore understood the incentives that higher prices would 
bring.5 The main roadblocks for taxes were Congress and the American 
people. Polling evidence at the time suggests that consumers preferred 
price controls and rationing over higher gasoline taxes. They also pre-
ferred taxes on low fuel economy vehicles over increases in gasoline 
prices. Given the saliency of the costs associated with rationing gasoline 
consumption, namely, the potential for queueing, it seems difficult to 
argue that these alternative policies were adopted because they hide 
their true costs. This would seem to suggest one of two possibilities, or 
a combination of the two: (1) we tend to overstate the value of people’s 
time for activities such as refueling, and (2) concerns about the regres-
sivity of policies such as gasoline taxes outweigh their efficiency gain.6 
II. Policy Responses
The United States enacted a variety of policies designed to reduce con-
sumption and limit price impacts. The discussion at the time centered 
around a desire for policymakers to keep oil and gasoline expenditures 
down and to limit “windfall” profits for domestic oil companies. In this 
section, I discuss the policies adopted. 
A.  Supply- Side Policies
Prior to the oil embargo, oil and gasoline markets were already stressed. 
The MOIP reduced oil imports, and President Nixon instituted price 
controls for oil beginning in 1971 as part of a large program controlling 
prices. These actions led to oil shortages in 1971 and 1972 and long lines 
for gasoline in 1972. The 1971 shortage and the expectation of a short-
age in 1972 prompted Nixon to lift import controls for Canadian oil. 
The imposition of price controls, and their popularity in 1971 likely 
laid the groundwork for the policies adopted during the oil crises and 
policymakers’ resistance to taxes. While firms and labor unions tended 
to oppose price (and wage) controls, they appeared to be popular 
among consumers (and even some academic economists).7 A Harris 
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poll in early 1972 found that respondents, by a 53 to 23 margin, believed 
Nixon’s price controls were doing “more good than harm.”8 In fact, the 
description of the poll results point to concerns among respondents that 
Nixon was being too flexible on prices. 
The time series of approval ratings for Nixon’s economic policies also 
points to the popularity of his price control policies. Table 1 shows a 
time series of a Harris poll asking: “Do you feel the economic policies 
of the Nixon administration are doing more good than harm or more 
harm than good?” Nixon’s approval rating jumped up right when price 
controls were adopted and hovered near 50%, while tending to hover 
around 30% prior to the controls. 
The oil embargo struck in October of 1973. In November of 1973, 
Nixon signed the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act which further 
regulated oil prices. The Act created a two- tiered pricing system. “Old 
oil”—those wells drilled before 1973—had a price ceiling of $5.25 a 
barrel ($19.44 in 2011 dollars). “New oil” was defined as oil from wells 
that began operation after 1972, or production from old wells above the 
wells’ 1972 production levels. The price of new oil could be as high as 
$11 per barrel ($40.74 per barrel in 2011 dollars), close to the world price 
at the time of roughly $12 per barrel ($44.44).9 The Act also extended 
price controls for refined products. The two- tiered pricing structure cre-
ated large rent transfers. Those refineries that had access to old oil were 
more profitable than those relying on imports or new oil. In response 
to this, “old oil entitlements” were issued beginning in 1974 to equate 
the benefits, more or less, of old oil across refineries. To do this, refiner-
ies that used more old oil had to buy entitlements from refineries that 
consumed more imported oil. 
Shortages in 1974 led to a nationwide odd- even rationing program. 
Vehicles with license plates ending in an odd number could purchase 
Table 1
Harris Survey Results Related Price Controls, April 6, 1972
Month  %More Good than Harm  %More Harm than Good  % Not Sure 
March 1972 47 28 25 
January 48 27 25 
September 1971 53 23 24 
August 47 29 24 
May 32 40 28 
March 34 37 29 
January  35  39  26 
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gas on odd days; those with even- numbered license plates could pur-
chase fuel on even days. To even out access, everyone could purchase 
gasoline on the 31st. Given the infrequency in which vehicles refuel, it 
isn’t clear whether odd- even rationing reduced consumption. 
Ford entered office in August of 1974. Ford pushed for decontrol of 
oil prices, but Congress rejected his proposals. The Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975 (Public Law 94- 163) was a compro-
mise, of sorts. The Act, which lasted 40 months, reduced price controls 
for domestic oil, reversed a $2 tariff on oil imports (discussed below), 
and created a maximum average price for domestic oil. Under the Act, 
average oil prices would fall from their current level of $8.75 a barrel 
to $7.66, and be allowed to grow up to 10% per year, at the discretion 
of the president, until February of 1977. After this date, Congress could 
stop any increase in oil prices above the rate of inflation.10 The Act was 
later amended in September of 1976 to allow prices to increase by 10% 
a year for the entire 40- month period. The Act also required decreases 
in crude prices be passed through, in their entirety, at “all levels of dis-
tribution from the producer through the retail level . . . ” 
Ford reluctantly signed the EPCA, stating: “This legislation is by no 
means perfect. It does not provide all the essential measures that the 
Nation needs to achieve energy independence as quickly as I would 
like. However, after balancing the inadequacies and the merits, I have 
concluded that this bill is in the national interest and should be enacted 
into law.” His reluctant support came from the fact that the Act gradu-
ally phased out price controls: “The bill seeks to lower retail prices in 
the short term and runs the risk of creating a false impression that we 
can have all the energy we want at cheaper prices. But over time, this 
legislation removes controls and should give industry sufficient incen-
tive to explore, develop, and produce new fields in the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf, Alaska, and potential new reserves in the lower 48 states. I 
fully intend to use the flexibility which is granted to me by this legisla-
tion to expedite the decontrol of crude oil in order to increase domestic 
production. I do not expect the Congress to stand in the way of such 
actions.”11 
The second oil crisis led to the large shortages of gasoline. Despite 
resistance from Congress and consumer groups, Carter began phas-
ing out price controls on oil as soon as EPCA allowed (June of 1979).12 
Carter also increased the allotted markup for refining in early 1980, in-
creasing gasoline prices independent of the change in crude prices.13 
Pressure from the Department of Energy (DOE) and the announce-
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ment that price controls would be relaxed during 1979 may have exac-
erbated shortages. Verleger (1979) documents that while the DOE called 
on refineries to build up inventories of gasoline at the beginning of the 
year, they also called on refineries to build up inventories of distillate 
fuels in April, leading to more crude oil being used to make fuel for 
winter heating. In addition, the price control system may have led to 
an incentive to withhold gasoline, at least on the margin. The price of 
gasoline was based on the previous month’s crude acquisition costs. 
Depending on a refinery’s expectations about the price path of oil, this 
could have created an incentive to store gasoline for the next month. 
Furthermore, because the phasing out of price controls was announced, 
there was an additional incentive to withhold until prices were free to 
adjust. 
The effect of phasing out price controls on US production is unclear, 
but there is some evidence that production increased. Figure 8 plots 
monthly domestic production and includes vertical lines represent-
ing the EPCA’s passage, which allowed crude prices to increase 10% 
per year and the phasing out of price controls. It also includes a low-
est smoothed line for each of the three time periods. There was a clear 
downward trend in US production from 1974 to 1977, when price con-
Fig. 8. Monthly US production of oil
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trols were at their strictest. While hardly conclusive, there is some evi-
dence that production initially increased in 1977, when EPCA allowed 
oil prices to increase by 10% per year. Production fell toward the end 
of 1978, possibly because oil producers knew price controls would be 
phased out in 1979. Production then increased after the phase out be-
gan, leveled off, but then fell with oil prices in 1986. 
B.  Demand- Side Policies
One of the first policies adopted to reduce consumption was a reduc-
tion in the speed limit to 55 miles per hour. On January 3, 1974, Nixon 
signed into law the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act 
(Public Law 93- 239) that gave states 60 days to reduce speed limits or 
lose all federal highway funds. The Act also allotted $1.5 billion to fi-
nance a new rail system.14 
The EPCA of 1975, discussed above, also created Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE). The Act set  company- level mini-
mum average fuel economy levels for model years starting in 1978, giv-
ing regulatory power to the Department of Transportation’s National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration. CAFE standards were actually 
a compromise. Congress (and the Ford administration) initially con-
sidered taxes on “gas guzzlers.” Initial values for the gas guzzler tax 
would have placed a tax of $1,000 on cars with fuel economy below 13 
miles per gallon. This was voted down by a 235 to 166 margin.15 
The standards under CAFE were viewed as much weaker than the 
proposed gas guzzler taxes and were “not strenuously opposed by the 
automobile manufacturers.”16 The vote was 306 to 86. A second rea-
son suggesting why labor unions and automobile manufacturers sup-
ported CAFE standards (relative to the gas guzzler tax) was that the 
two groups factored in the history of postponing the implementation of 
tailpipe pollution standards when manufacturers argued they were too 
costly.17 In fact, after oil prices fell in the mid- 1980s, CAFE standards 
were relaxed because manufacturers argued they were too costly. 
Unlike the price controls extended by the EPCA, CAFE standards 
continue today. The 2011 standards were 30.2 miles per gallon (mpg) for 
cars and 24.1 mpg for  light- duty trucks and SUVs. Beginning in 2012, 
CAFE standards changed considerably in the sense that they are now 
“footprint based.” That is, the standard is now  vehicle- specific; larger 
vehicles, measured by the circumference of their wheels, face a lower 
standard. As a result, it is difficult to know exactly how average fleet 
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fuel economy will evolve, but the targets for 2012 were 33.3 mpg for 
cars and 25.4 for  light- duty trucks and SUVs. 
The Energy Tax Act of 1978 (Public Law 95- 618) established gas guzzler 
taxes. These were much lower than those considered in 1974. The tax be-
gan with 1980 model year vehicles and was limited to cars that weighed 
below 6,000 pounds; light trucks were exempt. Vehicles that were subject 
to the tax and had a fuel economy between 14 and 15 mpg were taxed 
at $200 ($474 in 2011 dollars), while those with fuel economies below 14 
mpg were taxed at $550 ($1304 in 2011 dollars). The Act called for these 
to eventually increase to $1,800 and $3,850, respectively.18 The number of 
taxed vehicles was extremely low. In 1980, only 11 vehicles were subject 
to the tax; this increased to 12 vehicles in 1981 and 20 in 1982.19 
Gas guzzler taxes remain today. The tax rates and fuel economy cut-
offs have not changed since 1991. Therefore, inflation and technologi-
cal progress have eroded their effective tax levels; that is, whether a 
vehicle is a “gas guzzler” is a relative term that depends on the the 
level of technology. Table 2 lists the tax levels and cutoffs that were 
established in 1991. The table also reports the “equivalent” tax levels 
and cutoffs for 2011. Specifically, I adjust the tax levels to account for 
inflation. I also calculate the equivalent 1991 fuel economy cutoffs by 
accounting for technological progress using a rate of 2% per year, which 
is broadly consistent with Knittel (2011). For example, a  modern- day 
vehicle whose fuel economy is between 21.5 mpg and 22.5 would be in 
the same portion of the distribution for fuel economy as a 1991 vehicle 
whose fuel economy was between 14.5 mpg and 15.1 mpg. That 1991 
Table 2
Gas Guzzler Tax Levels and Cutoffs in 1991 and Their Equivalents in 2011
1991 Cutoffs  
1991  
Dollars  “Equivalent” 2011 Cutoffs  
2011  
Dollars 
Between 21.5 mpg & 22.5 mpg $1,000 Between 14.5 mpg & 15.1 mpg $660 
Between 20.5 mpg & 21.5 mpg $1,300 Between 13.8 mpg & 14.5 mpg $858 
Between 19.5 mpg & 20.5 mpg $1,700 Between 13.1 mpg & 13.8 mpg $1,122 
Between 18.5 mpg & 19.5 mpg $2,100 Between 12.4 mpg & 13.1 mpg $1,386 
Between 17.5 mpg & 18.5 mpg $2,600 Between 11.8 mpg & 12.4 mpg $1,716 
Between 16.5 mpg & 17.5 mpg $3,000 Between 11.1 mpg & 11.8 mpg $1,980 
Between 15.5 mpg & 16.5 mpg $3,700 Between 10.4 mpg & 11.1 mpg $2,442 
Between 14.5 mpg & 15.5 mpg $4,500 Between 9.8 mpg & 10.4 mpg $2,970 
Between 13.5 mpg & 14.5 mpg $5,400 Between 9.1 mpg & 9.8 mpg $3,564 
Between 12.5 mpg & 13.5 mpg $6,400 Between 8.4 mpg & 9.1 mpg $4,224 
Less than 12.5  $7,700  Less than 8.4  $5,082 
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vehicle would be taxed at $1,000, but in today’s dollars this is equiva-
lent to a tax of $660. 
A number of policies were also adopted implicitly or explicitly sub-
sidizing alternative fuels. The Energy Tax Act of 1978, besides creating 
the gas guzzler taxes, also had a provision that exempted gasoline that 
was mixed with at least 10% ethanol from the federal gasoline tax (4 
cents at the time). Later, the Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988 (Public 
Law 100- 494) gave credits under CAFE to vehicles capable of running 
on certain alternative fuels. Under the Act, gasoline consumption of 
a vehicle, for CAFE purposes, is calculated assuming that 50% of the 
time the vehicle runs on pure gasoline, while the other 50% of the time 
it runs on its alternative fuel. The Automotive Fuel Economy Manufac-
turing Incentives for Alternative Fueled Vehicles Rule of 2004 extended 
these credits. 
Renewable Fuel Standards—requirements to buy a minimum 
amount of alternative fuels—began with the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
(Public Law 109- 58). The Act required sales of alternative fuels which 
includes, among others, ethanol, methanol, and biodiesel. It required 
7.5 billion gallons of alternative fuels to be sold in 2012. The Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 (Public Law 110- 140) 
extended the original Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), and differenti-
ates fuels based on their lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions. The RFS 
calls for minimum levels of a variety of “advanced” biofuels—biofuels 
that achieve large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions relative to 
gasoline.20 Ultimately the current RFS calls for 36 billion gallons of al-
ternative fuels to be sold in 2022. 
C. What Happened to Fuel Consumption?
Figure 7 illustrates that oil consumption fell drastically during the oil 
shocks; not until 2000 did oil consumption reach its 1978 level on a per 
capita basis. In this section, I compare on- road transportation fuel con-
sumed over time and across countries. 
Figure 9 plots fuel consumption for on- road use of gasoline and 
diesel, in gallons of oil equivalent per capita, for a large set of coun-
tries over time. Consumption in the United States exceeded all other 
countries prior to the oil shocks and continues to do so today. At least 
two patterns emerge. First, Canada appears to have lagged behind the 
United States in responding to the second oil price shocks. Canada, a 
net exporter of oil, initially kept prices below those in the United States. 
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Second, consumption in the European countries responded little to the 
second price shock. Some European countries effectively smoothed the 
price shock by reducing fuel taxes.21 Both of these points is illustrated 
in table 3 for a subset of Organisation for Economic Co- operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. Canadian prices did not respond 
much in 1978 and 1979, but did in 1980. United Kingdom prices fell in 
1978 and didn’t increase by nearly as much as prices in Italy, nor did 
prices in Germany and France. Because US gasoline taxes were so low, 
changes in crude prices had a larger impact, in percentage terms, on 
prices. 
I next normalize consumption at each country’s 1972 level and plot 
normalized consumption in figure 10. Both the United States and Can-
Fig. 9. Gasoline and diesel consumption across countries over time (gallons per capita)
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Table 3
Percentage Change in Retail Gasoline Price and Taxes as Share of Price, 1970 to 1979
Country  
% Change in 
Price from 
1970 to 1978  
% Change in 
Price from 
1970 to 1978  
Effective 
Tax Rate 
in 1970  
Effective 
Tax Rate 
in 1978  
Effective 
Tax Rate 
in 1979 
Canada 1.9 3.3 82.2 59.5 47.9 
France 16.3 14.3 289.5 132.5 180.0 
Germany 7.7 15.2 263.5 143.1 125.7 
Italy 41.8 37.4 364.3 254.7 208.9 
Japan –0.3 19.5 141.8 72.5 72.0 
United 
Kingdom –15.2 16.6 257.1 71.6 46.90 
United States 7.5  35.1  44.2  25.0  18.2 
Source: Tait and Morgan (1980). 
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ada exhibited the slowest growth in consumption since 1972. While one 
may take this as evidence that US and Canadian policies were most 
effective, it is difficult to distinguish this from a level effect and dif-
ferences in income growth. The United States and Canada had more 
room to reduce consumption because the fuel economy of their vehicle 
stock was so much lower than in other countries. Countries also varied 
considerably in their income growth over this time period. To control 
for changes in income, population density, and average year effects, I 
regress the log of fuel consumption on the log of population density, the 
log of GDP, and year- and  country- fixed effects. I then normalize the 
residuals to their 1972 levels. These are plotted in figure 11.22 After con-
trolling for changes in GDP and population density, the increase in fuel 
Fig. 11. Normalized gasoline and diesel consumption across countries over time 
(gallons per capita)
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consumption of the United States (and Canada) is toward the middle of 
the distribution. Therefore, even without accounting for the level effect, 
it doesn’t appear as though the growth in US fuel consumption was low 
compared to these countries. 
III. Were Gas Taxes on the Table?
A. The Nixon Administration
President Nixon was not against gas taxes. In fact, Nixon pushed for 
gasoline taxes even before the oil embargo. In November of 1970, Presi-
dent Nixon proposed to Congress a modest two to three cents per gal-
lon tax (9 and 14 cents in 2011 dollars, respectively) for leaded gas. The 
proposal was not in response to concerns about oil imports, but was 
instead viewed as a revenue generator and a way to promote unleaded 
gasoline.23 The Nixon administration again considered a gasoline tax in 
1973. Prior to the embargo, gasoline prices increased from 38.5 cents per 
gallon in May to over 55 cents in June. Gasoline taxes were considered 
a way to reduce the shortages generated from the price controls. It was 
reported that in June of 1973 many of Nixon’s advisors supported a tax 
as high as ten cents per gallon (40 cents in 2011 dollars).24 The regressiv-
ity of such a tax was frequently noted in newspaper articles and op- eds 
of the time. For example, a June 6, 1973, New York Times letter to the edi-
tors by Carl M. Selinger, Dean of Bard College, entitled “The Immoral-
ity of Raising the Gasoline Tax,” compared a gasoline tax to a law where 
“it would be unlawful for any worker with a large family, a low income 
and other heavy financial obligations to drive his car to work. . . . “Fore-
seeing the large economics literature that would develop as a result of 
not imposing gasoline taxes, the op- ed did admit that alternatives” may 
give us a somewhat less efficient society—but that is not an excessive 
price to pay to keep it a decently just one.” 
The embargo led to more discussions about the merits of a gas tax. 
A November 10 New York Times article reports that the administration 
was considering a 40 cents gasoline tax ($1.61 in 2011 dollars), with the 
revenues refunded back to consumers. Nixon’s economic advisors sup-
ported such a plan, but the Treasury Department opposed it because 
a refunded tax would be difficult to administer. Such a large tax ap-
pears to have been abandoned by the administration, and reports from 
December of 1973 state that President Nixon pushed for a 10 cents per 
gallon gasoline tax.25 After this met resistance in Congress, the admin-
This content downloaded from 018.051.000.096 on February 19, 2019 08:58:44 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
The Political Economy of Gasoline Taxes: 115
istration then floated an idea of taxing “excess” gasoline consumption. 
According to the plan, families would be allowed to purchase 14 gal-
lons of gasoline tax free for their first car and seven gallons of gasoline 
tax free for the second car, but this did not appear to gain traction.26 
B. The Ford Administration
In contrast to Nixon and despite much support within his administra-
tion, President Ford was staunchly against increasing gasoline taxes. He 
was not, however, against raising the price of gasoline, as he supported 
tariffs on foreign oil and pushed to decontrol oil prices. 
Ford called for a reduction in US oil consumption of one million bar-
rels per day by the end of 1975—roughly a 6% reduction from 1974 lev-
els. Newspaper articles from November and December of 1974 suggest 
that many of the president’s top energy advisors pushed for a gas tax to 
meet this goal, despite the unpopularity of such a tax with the public. 
Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton was one of the main propo-
nents, although it was reported that four of Nixon’s senior advisors sup-
ported such a tax: Morton, Treasury Secretary William E. Simon, Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger, Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) chair 
Alan Greenspan, and Federal Energy administrator John C. Sawhill.27 
Morton vocally advocated for a 30 cents per gallon tax ($1.01 in 2011 
dollars) with most of the money refunded back to consumers as early 
as late 1973.28 After Ford had publicly ruled out an increase in gaso-
line taxes in October of 1974, Sawhill appeared on a  nationally- televised 
show outlining a proposal to raise the gasoline tax by 10 to 30 cents with 
the revenue used to lower income taxes.29 
In November of 1974, Secretary Morton went on TV supporting a gas-
oline tax. The next day, the president responded by saying “I thought 
that others in the executive branch got the word, and I hope this word is 
conveyed to my good friend, the secretary of the interior. We are not con-
sidering an increase in the gasoline tax.”30 It is widely believed that the 
public support for a gas tax led to the firing of both Morton and Sawhill.31 
Ford suggested that his major concerns were the regressivity of such 
a tax and its large incidence on rural communities.32 But, the president 
also seems to have viewed the idea of taxing a product, but then re-
funding the revenues from that tax back to consumers, as a logical in-
consistency.33 
According to the Associated Press at the time, the White House was in-
stead considering mileage standards, tax credits for efficient cars, weight 
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and horsepower restrictions, rationing, and somewhat ironically, oil tar-
iffs that could turn into taxes on all oil production. 
Besides Ford’s advisors, other policymakers of the time favored gas 
taxes. The bipartisan Joint Economic Committee recommended a 30 
cents gasoline tax with the estimated $25 billion refunded to consumers. 
To put this in perspective the federal gasoline tax at the time was a mere 
four cents. Newspaper articles at the time appeared to actively debate 
the merits.34 The arguments in favor of the tax note the smaller transac-
tion costs compared to rationing and equate it to a coupon rationing 
program with saleable coupons (although changing who captures the 
rents). The arguments against this focus on regressivity of such a tax 
and its inflationary effect. 
By the end of 1974, President Ford may have left the door slightly 
open for increases in gasoline taxes.35 The New York Times reported that 
President Ford had his main advisors meet him in Colorado on Decem-
ber 26 to discuss energy policy. The article reports that the president 
would entertain proposals for a higher gasoline tax. Why the shift? The 
need for revenue. Congress called for a reduction in income tax rates 
to ease the recession and Ford viewed a gasoline tax as a way to offset 
these revenue reductions.36 This shift is consistent with Ford not under-
standing the merits of taxing a product to change marginal incentives 
while returning the revenues from the tax to consumers. 
The door wasn’t open for long, as it slammed shut the next day 
when Ford said of a gasoline tax: “That’s about as dead as any option 
I know. . . . I think there are many better choices.”37 Ford reiterated this 
view in his January 1975 State of the Union Address that highlighted 
his energy plan, stating: “I want you to know that before deciding on 
my energy conservation program, I considered rationing and higher 
gasoline taxes as alternatives. In my judgment, neither would achieve 
the desired results and both would produce unacceptable inequities.” 
In its place, Ford called for mileage standards. 
Somewhat counter to such strong opposition to gasoline taxes, in his 
State of the Union Address, Ford also said that he would use his presi-
dential powers (specifically Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962) to impose a $1 per barrel tariff on imported oil beginning on Feb-
ruary 1, 1975 ($3.33 in 2011 dollars). The tariff would increase to $2 on 
March 1 and $3 on April 1. Ford also called for domestic crude prices to 
be decontrolled. He promised to rescind the tariffs when “broader but 
necessary legislation is enacted.” He went on to say: “To that end, I am 
requesting the Congress to act within 90 days on a more comprehensive 
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energy tax program. It includes: excise taxes and import fees totaling $2 
per barrel on product imports and on all crude oil; deregulation of new 
natural gas, and enactment of a natural gas excise tax.” Ford’s attempts 
to decontrol oil prices were killed by the House in July of 1975.38 
How receptive was Congress to a gasoline tax increase or oil taxes? 
Support for, and opposition against, cut across political parties, al-
though Democrats, on average, appear to have been more favorable. 
The Senate Democratic leader, Mike Mansfield, stated he was open to 
higher gasoline taxes:
He would take another look at proposals to raise the federal gasoline tax ‘by 10, 
20, 25 cents a gallon’ if such an increase were proposed by President Ford as 
part of a balanced package of energy conservation measures.
A number of other key Democratic senators supported gasoline taxes. 
For example, Lloyd Bentsen, D- Texas, proposed a gasoline tax, to be 
rebated back to consumers, that would begin at five cents in 1976 and 
increase to 30 cents per gallon in four years.39 The House Democrat’s 
energy plan for 1975 included an increase in the gas tax of 23 cents per 
gallon.40 
Other Democrats opposed gasoline taxes. One of the biggest oppo-
nents was the Democratic chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, 
Wilbur D. Mills from Arkansas. In an August 1974 speech to the South-
ern Farmers Association, Mills stated that if the Ford administration 
put forth a ten cents gas tax, “he (Ford) would know that as long as I 
am chairman of the Ways and Means Committee it would not be en-
acted.”41 Senators Walter Mondale, D- Minnesota and Edmund Muskie, 
D- Maine were also publicly opposed. Opposition to tax increases ap-
peared to have been based, at least publicly, on the regressive nature 
of the tax. For example, Representative Peter Peyser, R- New York, and 
John Brademas, D- Indiana, circulated a letter asking their colleagues to 
oppose a tax on the grounds that it would “push the already strained 
working man and working woman past the financial breaking point.”42 
1. Key Stakeholders Response to Gasoline Taxes
While President Ford seemed to be against gasoline taxes, another Ford 
supported an increase in gasoline taxes. Henry Ford II recommended 
a ten cent gasoline tax in November of 1974. His support for such a tax 
was driven by his desire to use the revenues to help the US auto indus-
try. General Motors and Chrysler initially opposed the idea, but less 
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than a month later, the newly appointed chairman of General Motors, 
Thomas A. Murphy, stated: “If in the judgment of the administration it 
looks like a gasoline tax is necessary, I think we ought to consider it.”43 
Roughly a month of reflection by the automobile industry led to even 
more support for increased taxes, albeit for petroleum taxes rather than 
gasoline taxes. The automobile industry understood that higher gaso-
line prices might carry some benefits because shortages adversely af-
fected sales. A petroleum tax would also broaden the scope of the price 
increases. The  light- duty industry only consumed 28% of US oil at this 
time, and much of the oil went to heating and electricity generation. 
A December 23, 1974, New York Times article reports: 
The automobile industry is moving toward favoring some form of tax on pe-
troleum in the hope of guaranteeing an unregulated and adequate supply of 
gasoline for its products in the future. The industry also believes that a tax on 
petroleum, although it would increase gasoline prices and therefore tend to cut 
car sales and accelerate the trend toward smaller cars, would be less painful 
than some of the energy conservation measures being considered by Congress 
and the Ford administration.
While conventional wisdom today seems to be that CAFE standards 
were favored by US automobile manufacturers at the time, it isn’t clear. 
The same article goes on to say:
Elliott M. Estes, the president of the General Motors Corporation, for example, 
said in a recent interview that he would favor a tax on imported petroleum, 
which would lead to high gasoline prices, rather than further government regu-
lations to improve fuel economy on cars.
Henry Ford II also adjusted his position by stating that “another way 
to accomplish these goals would be to level a general excise tax on pe-
troleum. This might be more effective and equitable and it would cer-
tainly generate more revenue.” The same article says that Chrysler and 
American Motors Corporation (AMC) were expected to also support an 
excise tax, as well as eliminating price controls on “old oil.” 
Another key group of stakeholders were farmers. While there is some 
indication that farmers opposed an increase in the gasoline tax (e.g., 
Mills’s speech discussed above), their opposition does not seem to be 
particularly vocal. Newspaper searches in Google’s new archive for 
“gas tax and farmer/farming/farm” are few. In addition, it is difficult 
to separate out the farmer effect from the low income effect. 
The oil industry does not appear to have been very vocal regarding 
gasoline or oil taxes, at least publicly. The oil industry was often vilified 
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by the public and many policymakers expressed concerns about wind-
fall profits for domestic oil producers resulting from changes in the 
world price for oil.44 Therefore, they may have consciously tried to stay 
out of public forums. There is also evidence that the threat of further 
regulation put pressure on oil companies, notably large oil companies, 
to keep prices for refined products down. (See, Erfle, Pound, and Kalt 
1981; and Erfle and McMillan 1990.) 
Consumers seemed to have been the biggest opponents of gasoline 
taxes. Polling at the time suggested that the public supported gas taxes 
only under certain, and unrealistic, circumstances. 
A Harris Survey asked 1,525 households a series of questions on vary-
ing the size of the tax, its impact on oil imports, and the use of the rev-
enue. Table 4 summarizes the results. The poll asked consumers if they 
would support a ten or 20 cents tax increase without any other conditions. 
Consumers overwhelmingly opposed such a tax. Support increased if ei-
ther consumers received an income tax credit for the gasoline taxes or the 
10 cents tax meant the United States would no longer import oil from the 
Middle East.45 Only if consumers were able to write off tax payments and 
a 10 cents tax leading the United States to be independent of Middle East 
oil did a slight majority of those polled support a tax. 
Consumers appeared to have preferred other, less efficient ways to 
reduce consumption. When asked whether they would prefer a tax on 
gasoline or a tax on large inefficient cars in order to limit gasoline con-
sumption, 70% of those survey by the Opinion Research Corporation 
(ORC) Public Opinion Index in December of 1974 preferred a tax on 
large cars; only 13% favored a tax on gasoline.46 
Consumers also preferred rationing over increases in fuel prices. 
When asked whether they would prefer the country to conserve oil 
Table 4
Harris Survey Results Related to Gas Taxes, November 1974
Question  % Favor % Oppose % Not Sure 
Unqualified 20 cents tax increase 7 88 5 
Unqualified 10 cents tax increase 13 74 13 
10 cents increase & tax credit on 
income tax 35 56 9 
10 cents increase if it meant US not 
dependent on Arab oil 39 47 14 
10 cents increase & tax credit on 
income tax & it meant US not 
dependent on Arab oil  51  38  11 
This content downloaded from 018.051.000.096 on February 19, 2019 08:58:44 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
120 Knittel
through mandatory gasoline rationing on an odd- even basis or an 
11cents increase in gasoline prices as a result of an import tariff on oil, 
60% of consumers preferred rationing, 25% preferred the tariff, with 
15% being undecided. This is a common theme. A similar survey in 
January of 1975 asked consumers if they prefer Ford’s oil tariff (pro-
jected to increase gasoline prices by 11 cents) to a nationwide rationing 
program with the understanding that consumers would not get all of 
the gasoline they needed. Some 61% of those surveyed preferred ration-
ing.47 A January 1974 New York Times article said the Federal Energy 
Office was receiving over 2,000 letters and telegrams a day on how to 
solve the energy crisis. About 90% of the letters preferred rationing.48 
Labor unions were also against gasoline taxes. On November 24, 
1973, in response to George P. Shultz, Nixon’s Secretary of Treasury, 
arguing in favor of a gasoline tax, the American Federation of Labor 
and Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL- CIO) asked Congress to 
block the Nixon administration from increasing gasoline taxes.49 
C. Carter Administration
President Carter pushed for gasoline taxes and oil tariffs throughout 
his presidency. In his 1977 energy plan, Carter called for an increase in 
the federal gasoline tax and the decontrol of oil and gasoline prices. Oil 
prices were still hovering at around $50 in real terms; they had been 
roughly constant from 1974 to 1977. But, price controls on oil and con-
cerns about the level of imports continued efforts to incentivize conser-
vation. 
Carter’s gasoline tax plan was based on whether the nation’s oil 
consumption exceeded some baseline. Under the plan, if gasoline con-
sumption exceeded the target in 1978, a five cents tax would be im-
posed. For every percentage point where future consumption exceeded 
the target, an additional five cents would be added to the tax. The entire 
tax was capped at 50 cents.50 The revenues from the tax would be given 
back to consumers in the way of tax credits on a per capita basis.51 
Carter’s proposal also called for replacing price controls on crude 
oil with a tax equal to the difference between the price control and the 
world price. Again, one of, if not the main motivation behind price con-
trols for domestic oil, was concerns that allowing domestic supplies to 
get the market price would result in windfall profits for oil companies. 
A tax equal to the price differences also accomplished this, but because 
gasoline prices were based on average acquisition costs, Carter’s plan 
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would increase gasoline prices (and shift rents away from refiners). Ac-
cording to the plan, all domestic prices would increase to the “new” oil 
price of $11.28 a barrel (in nominal dollars) in 1979, and old oil would 
be taxed the difference between the current price control ($2.25 per bar-
rel) and $11.28. Domestic oil prices for existing resources would con-
tinue to be subject to price controls of $2.25 and $11.28 per barrel for 
oil and new oil. Newly discovered oil would be allowed to move to the 
market price over a  three- year period. New oil was defined as a well 
farther than 2.5 miles away from an existing well or 1,000 feet deeper 
than an existing well if it was within the 2.5 mile radius. 
Despite being  Democratic- controlled, Congress blocked his attempts.52 
The main opposition came from rural states and from labor groups. 
Shortly after his proposal, the president of the Building and Construction 
Trades Department of the AFL- CIO said: “We must not hit hardest those 
with the lowest incomes. High gasoline taxes would be a regressive tax 
on the poor, and there’s little evidence that high gasoline prices would 
promote conservation.”53 The president of the International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, Frank E. Fitzsimmons, said that it would be “awfully hard 
on the people who must commute some 20 and 30 miles to work.”54 
There was some initial optimism in Congress that such a tax could 
be passed. Representative Al Ullman, D- Oregon, chairman of the Ways 
and Means Committee said that: “There’s always been strong opposi-
tion and always will be. That’s just automatic.” But, he went on to say, 
“A gas tax, put together a certain way, with adequate rebates, would 
be passable.”55 Others were more skeptical. Senator William D. Hatha-
way, D- Maine, said, “The rural states would have a particular problem 
adjusting to a gas tax increase. . . . Past history would indicate it would 
not have much of a chance of passage in Congress.”56 By now, many 
were convinced that the US car culture rendered higher gas taxes a non-
starter. Senator Henry M. Jackson, D- Washington, and chairman of the 
Energy and Natural Resources Committee, called Carter’s gas tax, “ 
just not doable” going on to say: “Right or wrong, we have an automo-
bile culture. The truth is, people are going to continue to buy gasoline 
because they have to get to work.” In 1977 there were 0.67 vehicles per 
capita compared to over 0.80 today.57 
Senator Jackson’s views seemed to represent those of consumers. A 
CBS/New York Times survey, taken days after Carter’s energy plan 
was proposed, found that consumers opposed higher gasoline prices by 
a 62 to 32 margin, and higher oil prices by a 53 to 37 margin. The survey 
also found that blue- collar families were less likely to favor gas taxes 
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than  white- collar families. Similar to the current debate about climate 
change, one source of the lack of support for taxes was that not every-
one was convinced that an energy crisis existed. Small- car- driving re-
spondents agreed with Carter on the severity of the energy crisis by a 56 
to 38 margin, but only 38% of  large- car- driving respondents agreed.58 
On June  9, 1977, the Ways and Means Committee voted 27 to 10 
against Carter’s “stand- by” tax. It also voted 25 to 11 against a three 
cent tax with the revenues financing public transportation.59 There 
seemed to have been some optimism for the passage of the three cent 
tax, but members noted that the plan also called for oil taxes that would 
increase gasoline prices (these were ultimately not adopted, however).60 
There were a few attempts to revive the gasoline tax over the next few 
months, but nothing came of them. Ultimately, there was a tax placed 
on industrial oil use in cases where coal was an option, but no taxes 
passed that would affect gasoline prices. 
The oil and gasoline price landscape changed again in 1979 with the 
Iranian Revolution. Oil prices began the year below $50 a barrel (in 2011 
dollars), but began to inch up beginning in May when prices hit $56 a 
barrel. On November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian student revolutionaries 
took over the US Embassy in Tehran, holding more than 60 Americans 
hostage. Carter responded by imposing an oil embargo against Iran. 
Further unrest in Iran shut down oil exports. By the end of the year, 
prices were roughly $93 a barrel. By February of 1980, the price was 
about $100 a barrel. Calls for higher gas taxes began to show up in op-
 ed. A New York Times op- ed called for a  revenue- neutral $1 per gallon 
tax, but admitted that “The American people, most politicians reckon, 
are less willing to accept a tax on auto power than a tax on mother’s 
milk.”61 A month later Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin called for a 
tax of between 25 and 50 cents.62 In December, another op- ed in the New 
York Times called for a 50 cents tax saying, “America can deploy an oil 
weapon of its own—a stiff tax that would hold down the demand for 
gasoline, and whose revenues would be rebated to the public.”63 
The fate of a significant gasoline tax appeared to be sealed by 1980, 
however. Carter officials commented in January of 1980 that Carter had 
rejected proposals within the White House to increase the gasoline tax 
by 50 cents. The surprising defeat of Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark 
in the House of Commons after his party had tried to increase gasoline 
taxes was yet another warning of the political ramifications of pushing 
for gasoline taxes.64 
In March of 1980, Carter used his presidential powers, as Ford did 
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before him, to impose a $4.62 per barrel tariff on imported oil to begin 
on May 15 ($10.95 in 2011 dollars). The tariff was projected to increase 
gasoline prices by ten cents (24 cents in 2011 dollars). Once again Con-
gress resisted. Both the House and Senate passed legislation to block 
the tariff. Carter vetoed these attempts. What may have been the final 
nail in a gasoline tax coffin, the House overrode Carter’s veto by a vote 
of 335 to 34.65 The Senate voted the veto down by 68 to 10.66 This was 
the first time since 1952 that a president’s veto was overridden despite 
his party controlling both houses. 
Once again the regressivity of the tax was cited. Senator Dale Bum-
pers, D- Arkansas, was quoted as saying, “It’s an elitist policy that says, 
‘the rich will ride and the poor will walk.’” Others seemed to suggest 
that they may have supported the tariff if the revenues were used to 
lower other taxes. Senator Sam Nunn, D- Georgia, who initially voted 
against the legislation blocking it, but then voted to override the veto, 
cited no assurances from the White House that they would lower other 
taxes as the reason for his change of heart.67 
Polling evidence from the time suggests that Congress was voting 
with the will of the people; consumers continued to favor rationing 
over both gasoline taxes or allowing prices to clear the market. A 1977 
Cambridge Reports/Research International survey of 1,500 people 
found that 65% of people preferred rationing over allowing prices to 
adjust to $2 (nominal prices were roughly 60 cents) as a way of reducing 
a 25% shortage in gasoline; only 15% preferred the market outcome.68 
This was a steep increase from current prices of roughly 60 cents, but 
the $2 focal point does not appear to have driven these results. In April 
of 1978, the Gallup Organization conducted a poll asking: “If the con-
sumption of oil and gas is reduced in the United States, which of these 
two ways would you prefer as a way to achieve this: start a rationing 
program that would require drivers to reduce the miles they drive by 
about one- fourth, or raise the tax on gasoline so that a gallon will cost 
25 cents more than it currently does?” Some 55% of those polled fa-
vored rationing, while only 25% favored allowing prices to increase by 
25 cents.69 
Just prior to the long gasoline lines that occurred in the summer of 
1979, the Los Angeles Times conducted a survey asking whether higher 
prices or rationing is the answer to oil and gasoline shortages.70 Some 
42% of those polled preferred rationing, with 18% preferring “some 
other solution.” Only 28% preferred higher prices. Soon after the long 
lines, consumers did not appear to have changed their opinion. An ABC 
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News- Harris Poll of 1,192 people taken in January of 1980 found that 
80% of consumers were against a 50 cent gasoline tax. In contrast, 70% 
of respondents favored odd- even gas rationing, and 65% felt Congress 
should pass tougher gasoline rationing legislation. A New York Times 
poll taken around the same time suggests that there may not have been 
a strong  urban- rural split on this issue. Of the 502 New York City resi-
dents polled during December of 1979, 90% opposed raising gasoline 
taxes as a way of reducing gasoline demand. Rationing was favored by 
over 60%.71 
The comparison of similarly worded questions over time provide 
a way to measure by how much consumers’ attitudes changed. Cam-
bridge Reports/National Omnibus Survey conducted a similar poll (in 
1980), to their 1977 poll asking whether consumers would prefer ra-
tioning to gasoline prices of $2. Two things changed between the polls. 
First, prices increased to roughly $1.20. Second, the negatives of short-
age were fresh in consumers’ minds. Despite this, 49% of consumers 
continued to support rationing, compared to only 25% that support 
higher prices.72 This was a drop, however, from the 65% that favored 
rationing in 1977. 
IV. Conclusions
The oil crises of the 1970s led to a number of policies. Some of these—
price controls and rationing programs—no longer exist. Others, such as 
CAFE standards, gas guzzler taxes, and alternative fuel mandates, con-
tinue today. The economics literature is not short of papers suggesting 
these policies are much less efficient than Pigouvian taxes. In this paper, 
I reviewed the public discussions that took place on how to address 
high oil prices. Gasoline taxes were frequently discussed, even more so 
than today. Figure 12 shows that the number of New York Times articles 
containing the phrases “gasoline tax” was much lower during the 2008 
run up in gasoline prices, compared to those increases of the 1970s. 
While gasoline taxes, and allowing prices to be decontrolled, appear 
to have been on the table and actively discussed as an alternative to 
price controls, CAFE standards, gas guzzler taxes, and public support 
for the efficient policy was lacking. 
A frequent argument for why CAFE standards and alternative fuel 
mandates exist is that these policies hide their true cost. This argument 
is difficult to reconcile with the public’s support for similarly ineffi-
cient policies such as  price- controls- plus- rationing and gas guzzler 
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taxes. The costs associated with  price- controls- plus- rationing and gas 
guzzler taxes are certainly salient. Consumers at the time had experi-
enced rationing and long gasoline lines, so would have understood the 
costs of these policies. Consumers also understood that prices for fuel 
inefficient vehicles would increase under gas guzzler taxes. What can 
explain the support? I don’t purport to answer this question. Perhaps, 
economists have overstated the value of people’s time, or understated 
the psychic costs associated with the regressivity of high energy prices. 
Admittedly, this runs counter to the results in Deacon and Sonstelie 
(1985) that find when faced with a choice of a zero queue bundled with 
a high price for gasoline and waiting for a low price, consumers seem to 
reveal a value of time that is in line with their wage rates. 
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Kellogg, Bob Pindyck, Dick Schmalensee, and Jim Sweeney. Financial disclosures: I cur-
rently have a grant through the MIT- Ford Motor Company Alliance that is funding a 
randomized controlled trial in Ford dealerships to determine whether better information 
about fuel consumption and fuel costs affect consumer purchase behavior. For acknowl-
edgments, sources of research support, and disclosure of the author’s material financial 
relationships, if any, please see http://www.nber.org/chapters/c13055.ack.
Fig. 12. Number of New York Times articles containing the phrase “gasoline tax” per year
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